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RECENT CASES
BANKRUPTcY-BANKS

AND

BANKING-COLLECTING

BANK

AS

PREFERRED

AcT-Defendant, a Federal Reserve Bank, having
received for collection checks remitted by member banks and drawn on bankrupt, accepted two drafts in satisfaction thereof. When payment of the drafts
was refused, defendant, after learning of bankrupt's insolvency, accepted a
partial cash payment, and credited the member banks proportionately. Trustee
in bankruptcy sought to recover the amount of the cash payment on grounds of
preference. Held, that it :was not a preference since defendant was not the
person benefited within the provisions of Bankruptcy Act. Carson v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 254 N. Y. 218, 172 N. E. 475 (193o).
The Bankruptcy Act' provides that if a creditor is enabled to obtain a
greater percentage of his debt than other creditors of the same class, by reason
of a transfer of property by an insolvent debtor executed within four months
bfefore the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, if such conveyance is made to one
having reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent, it amounts to a preference and the value thereof is recoverable by the trustee in bankruptcy. In determining whether the payment to the Federal Reserve Bank constituted a preference, the court regarded it as agent of the member banks in accordance with its
regulations; 2 and since a principal is regarded as actually paid when his
account is credited by his agent,' recovery of this payment from the agent was
denied. And in conformity with general rules of agency,' since a creditor is
charged with knowledge of facts which his agent knew or had reasonable cause
to know,' recourse to the member banks alone was proper.' Preference is a
technical term and cases are uniform in demanding the existence of antecedent
CREDITOR UNDER BANKRUPTCY

136 STAT. 842, II U. S. C. §96 (1911); Amend. of 191o §6ob.
I Theoregulations of the Federal Reserve Board provide "A federal reserve
bank will act only as agent of the bank from which it receives such checks";
it "may present such checks for collection direct to the bank on which they
are drawn"; and "may . . . at its option, either directly or through an agent,

accept . . . bank drafts . . . in lieu of cash" without being liable for any loss
resulting, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, Series of 1924, Regulation J. Subdiv. 7.
'Commercial Bank of Pa. v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50, 13 Sup. Ct. 533
(x893) ; Mr. Justice Brewer ibid. 58, 13 Sup. Ct. 535, says: "it was not a

mere matter of bookkeeping . . . ; it was the same as though the money had

actually reached the vaults . . ."; see National Park Bank of N. Y. v. Seaboard Bank, 114 N. Y. 28. 2o N. E. 632 (1889).
'2 MECHEm, AGENCY § 1803 (2d ed. 1914).
5
In re Campion, 256 Fed. 9o2 (N. D. N. Y. i919); Smith v. Coury, 247
Fed. i68 (D. Me. 1918).
6 Chief Justice Cardozo in principal case at 480, "The principals are solvent
banks, and the trustees are at liberty to pursue the money in their hands . ..
No obvious requirement of policy or justice exacts the suspension or abandonment of an established rule of law to the end that collection from an agent
may take the place of an existing and sufficient remedy by pursuit against the
principals."
(216)
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liability or a debtor-creditor-relationship " as essential thereto. Consequently
where the party is a mere collection agency, as in the principal case, or performs
9
as a conduit or intermediary, to wit, a bailee, such instrumentality cannot be
categorized as a preferred creditor within the meaning of the term. The law is
thus settled that recovery on the basis of a preference under the Bankruptcy
Act is confined to cases wherein the defendant acts independently, and is denied
when the defendant is employed in some representative capacity, even though it
holds the legal title thereto. The principal case is important in that it is
in which a Federal Reserve Bank was
apparently the first recorded instance
sued as preferred creditor for receiving payment of collection items in which it
acted as agent for another; but it is of greater legal significance in that it
may serve as a weighty precedent in all situations wherein any collecting bank
bears a corresponding relationship.'
BILIS AND NOTES-EFFEcT ON Accom ODATION INDORSERS OF WAIVER OF
DEMAND PROTEST AND NoTIcE-INTERPRETATION OF SEcrION IIo N. I. L.Action by payee of promissory note against one of two accommodation indorsers,
both of whom were officers of the Corporation which was maker of the note.
Before delivery to payee, both indorsed beneath a provision waiving demand,
protest, and notice printed on the back of the note. Defendant, in point of
time, was second to sign, and in position as well, his signature followed that
of the other indorser. Held, under the Negotiable Instruments Law,' that since
the indorsement of the first accommodation indorser intervened between the
waiver and the defendant's signature, the defendant is not bound by the waiver.
First National Bank v. Wolfson, 171 N. E. 46o (Mass. 193o) 2
At Common Law, a waiver preceding the maker's signature has been uniformly held an integral part of the contract, binding on all subsequent indorsers
3
The Negotiable Instruments Law has apas well as on the original parties.
7
Keystone Warehouse Co. v. Bissell, 203 Fed. 652 (C. C. A. 2d 1913);
Taylor v. Carraway, 282 Fed. 876 (E. D. N. C. 1922) ; rn re Kayser, 177 Fed.
383 (C. C. A. 3d 191o) (payment to creditors of bankrupt's wife no preference) ; Page v. Moore, 179 Fed. 988 (E. D. Pa. igio) (assignment of collateral to first indorser not render a subsequent indorser a person benefited under
the act).
'Taylor v. Carraway, supra note 7.
1 Keystone Warehouse Co. v. Bissell, supra note 7.
"Shortly after the principal case, another opinion appeared to the same
effect, not however, referring to the former decision, Hirning v. Federal Reserve Bank, 42 F. (2d) 925 (D. Minn. 1930).
I The instant case illustrates clearly that collecting banks assume a dual role
in acting as principal and trustee in regard to the obligation, and at the same
time in negotiating as agent in respect to its duty to the depositor.

I NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 110, "Where the waiver is embodied in
the instrument itself, it is binding on all parties; but where it is written above
the signature of an indorser, it binds him only."
2 Contra: Central National Bank v. Sciotoville Mill Co., 79 W. Va. 782, 91
S. E.3 8o8 (1917).
Owensboro Saving Bank v. Haynes, 143 Ky. 534, 136 S. W. 1004 (91i);
Leeds v. Hamilton Paint & Glass Co., 35 S. W. 77 (Texas 1896); 2 DANIL.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS § 1092.
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parently made no change in this rule
Prior to this Act, too, by the weight of
authority, all indorsers whose signatures were subscribed to a waiver, printed'
on the back of a note When delivered, were held bound thereby,' and even where
the waiver had been written by an earlier indorser the effect was the same on
those signing thereunder:' Subsequent to the passage of the Act, some confusion
resulted from efforts to define what constitutes being "embodied in the instrument itself." ' It was believed that the purpose of this phrase was merely to enunciate the common law,' and that therefore, a printed waiver, on the back of the
note at delivery, was "embodied in the instrument," so as to bind all indorsers."0
But with the purpose of giving some effect to the second part of Section Io, it
was held that the first clause was limited to waivers on the face of the instrument
and that a waiver was, therefore, binding only on that indorser, whose signature
was first in position beneath it." While the wisdom of the latter view may be
questioned," it seems a logical interpretation of the section1
The principal case,
however, by holding one of two accommodation indorsers bound by a waiver,
when both signed virtually at the same time, before delivery, narrows the interpretation to the breaking point. In legal contemplation, these indorsements
became effective simultaneously,' at delivery, so that legally neither was prior
in existence. The instant case, moreover, ignores the obvious intention' o.f the
indorsers, inferable from the facts, to assume identical liabilities. Such a purposeless denial of the common law is foreign to the object of the Negotiable
Izstruments Law, enacted to codify existing law' as well as to establish the
law where unsettled. It seems more consistent with this end to construe the
second part of the disputed section, as relating to any waivers printed or
written on the instrument, subsequent to the original delivery'
NEGOTIABE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 110.
'While a distinction is sometimes seen between a waiver that is written,
and one that is printed, no such question can arise regarding "written" in § no,
of the N. I. L., in view of § i9', which provides that "written" shall include
"printed."
I Farmers Exchange Bank v. Altura Gold Mill & Mining Co., 129 Cal. 263,
6i Pac. 1077 (900) ; Farmers Bank v. Ewing, 78 Ky. 264 (1879).
'Parshley v. Heath, 69 Me. go (1879) ; Johnson v. Parker, 86 Mo. App.
66o (igoi) ; Contra: Central Bank v. Davis, ig Pick 373 (Mass. 1837).
"Suipra note 4.
' Portsmouth Saving Bank v. Wilson, 5 App. Cas. (D. C. 1894) ; BIGELoW,
LAW OF BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS (3d ed. 1928) § 440.
0Central National Bank v. Sciotoville Mill Co., supra note 2.
" Mooers v. Stalker, 194 Iowa 1354, 191 N. W. 175 (i922).
"See dissenting opinion in Mooers v. Stalker, mtlrz note II, at 1362, I9i
N. W. at 178; favorably criticized in (1923) 21 MIcH. L. REv. 697, 698, and in
(1923) 7 MINN. L. REv. 343, 344.
"See (1923) 8 IOwA L. BUu. 265.
I'Supra note 4, at i91 f; Barr v. Beckler, 264 Ill. 230, io6 N. E. -06
(914).

ISee Mooers v. Stalker, supra note ii, cited in principal case, in which the
court explicitly excludes the situation where the signers. are accommodation
indorsers signing under a waiver "obviously intended to bind all."
1" BIGELow, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 37.
" Central National Bank v. Sciotoville Mill Co., supra note 2, and see dissenting opinion per Evans, J. in Mooers v. Stalker, supra note 12.
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CONFLICT OF LAws-TAxAioN--JunrSDICTION
IIINISTERED BY

TRUSTEES

TO TAx INTANGIBLES ADDOMICILED IN A FOREIGN STATE-Complainant trus-

tees, residents of Massachusetts, who had been appointed by a New York probate
court to administer intangible securities' left in trust by a New York decedent
for beneficiaries not yet ascertained, ask abatement of tax levied in Massachusetts
under statute 2 taxing profits accruing from reinvestment of trust funds, on the
ground that a similar tax had already been exacted in New York. Held, that
since New York, the state whose courts controlled the trust, had fixed the
taxation situs as being in that state, Massachusetts no longer had any jurisdiction
to tax, even though the trustees were domiciled there and though the court
indicated that Massachusetts might have taxed if New York had not exercised
a prior right. Hutchins v. Commissioner, 172 N. E. 605 (Mass. 193o).
Except with regard to corporate stocks,3 the recent United States Supreme
Court decisions seem to recognize as bases for the taxation of intangible securities either (I) the domicile of the legal owner,' or (2) the business situs' where
the securities have become an integral part of some local business.! However, in the specific instance where securities are held by trustees living in a
foreign state, the court in the principal case advances the theory that a state
which manifests a statutory intent to tax a trust established and administered
by its court has a dominating right over any other state claiming under the
rule of domicile of trustees. Placing the jurisdiction to tax in the state which
controls the trust has the practical advantage of making it difficult for trustees
to conceal taxable securities from revenue authorities and of fixing the taxation
situs so that it would remain invariable however often the trustee changed
1

The nature and location of these securities do not appear in the opinion.
2MASs. GEN. LAws (1921) c. 62, § 1O, "The income received by estates held
in trust by trustees, any one of whom is an inhabitant of the Commonwealth . . .
shall be subject to the taxes assessed by this chapter to the extent that the
persons . . . for whose benefit it is accumulated are inhabitants of this Commonwealth. Income accumulated in trust for unborn or unascertained persons
or persons with contingent interests shall be taxed as if accumulated for the
benefit of inhabitants of the Commonwealth." The court in the instant case
holds that "unascertained beneficiaries" are in the same class as beneficiaries
who are inhabitants of the Commonwealth.
'Frick. v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603 (1925); Matter of
James, 144 N. Y. 6, 38 N. E. 961 (1894). See Note (1925) 38 HARV. L. REv.
809. 4
Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473 (1916) ; Blodgett v.
Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410 (1927); Farmer's Loan Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1930) ; see Note (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 532; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 5o Sup. Ct. 436 (193o), see
(1930) 79 U. OF PA. L. REV. 99. See Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax (1919) 32 HARv.
L. REV. 587, 593.
'New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. 11O (Igoo) ; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 2o5 U. S. 395, 27 Sup. Ct. 499
19o7) ; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Orleans Assessors, 221 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 550
(1910).

'If the credits of a non-resident owner are continually within a state, by a
process of collection and reinvestment or otherwise, they are sufficiently localized
to have acquired a sitits there, and consequently are taxable, see Bristol v.
Washington County, 177 U. S. 133, 20 Sup. Ct. 585 (900).
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domicile. Though the court definitely decides only that Massachusetts may not
tax if New York specifically claims jurisdiction, saying by way of dictum
that Massachusetts may tax if New York does not claim such jurisdiction, the
real basis of the court's decision seems to be that the state whose court controls
and administers trust property should have jurisdiction to tax that property. If
we accept the dictum, however, we are faced with an alternative situation which
to some extent lessens the simplicity which the recent United States Supreme
Court decisions have introduced into the jurisdiction to tax.' On the other hand,
if we go so far as to accept the basis of the court's decision that, even though
the legal owners are domiciled in Massachusetts, that state has no right to tax
since the New York courts control the trust, we oppose the decisions in the
It is to be feared that the simple rule implicit
vast majority of jurisdictions
in the main holding of the principal case, under which only the state controlling
the trust may tax, has come too late to affect the present line of cases which
tax intangible property held by foreign trustees in the same manner as such
property held by individuals who have both legal and equitable title.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ELECTIONS-ExCLUDING

NEGROES FROM VOTING AT

PaIM~m s-The Texas State Executive Committee of the Democratic Party
passed a resolution which in effect excluded all negroes from voting in the
Democratic primaries of 193o in Texas. The petitioner, a negro and an otherwise duly qualified voter, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the county
officials of the party to allow him to vote, on the ground that the statute'
which permitted such action by a political party, contravened the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Held, that the statute is constitutional, and the writ therefore refused.' White -v. Lubbock. 30 S. W. (2d)
722 (Texas 193o).
Farmer's Loan Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 4, at 209, 212, 50 Sup. Ct. at
99, ioo (where the domicile of the debtor and the temporary situs of the certificates of debt were definitely rejected as bases of taxation).
" Safe Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup.
Ct 59 (1929) (where the facts were so nearly identical to those of the instant
case that it seems impossible to reconcile the decisions except on the ground
that Virginia, unlike New York, had not by statute specifically claimed jurisdiction to tax the trust funds), see Note U. OF PA. L. Rav., supra note 4;
Augusta v. Kimball, 91 Me. 605, 40 Atl. 666 (1898); Baldwin v. Washington County, 85 Md. 145, 36 Atl. 764 (1897) (property held by guardian appointed by court) ; Detroit v. Lewis, 1o9 Mich. 155, 66 N. W. 985 (i898).

'AcTs Tax. 40TH LEG., ist C. S. (1927), c. 67, § I: "Every political party
in this State through its State Executive Committee shall have the power to
prescribe the qualifications of its own members and shall in its own way
determine who shall be qualified to vote or otherwise participate in such political
party; provided that no person shall ever be denied the right to participate
in a primary in this State because of former political views or affiliation or
because of membership or non-membership in organizations other than the
political party." See note 5, infra.
'The same decision might have been reached on a narrow point of pleading
and on the lack of petitioner's evidence; and, perhaps, also on ground of the
court's lack of "jurisdiction." As to the latter see the concurring opinion of
Pleasants, C. J., instant case, at page 725.
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The question here involved has arisen in our Federal courts on two other
recent occasions.3 Each time the question was adjudicated with the same result
as that reached by the principal case. The principles on which these results
rest are well-established. Authorities are abundant, to the effect that the provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments have reference to governmental action only, in contradistinction to individual action; the former amendment refers exclusively to state action, restraining state infringement of the
immunities and rights created by it; while the latter prohibits the United States
and the states generally from interfering with any privileges which may be
granted by such amendment.' However, political parties, it is often said,
are clearly not governmental agencies or state instrumentalities, but mere voluntary associations grouped for the propagation of their political beliefs, supreme
within their own sphere, and having the right to exclude whom they wish from
their fold. Further, a primary election is really not an election, but a mere
nominating device,' a method by which the party chooses inter ipsos those who
are to represent it as nominees in the general election. Such primaries, it is
generally held, are not included within state constitutional provisions concerning
"elections";' nor do they come within the purview of the term "election" or
the word "vote" as these terms are used in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend9
ments, respectively. These principles, perfectly intelligible as isolated units,
'Grigsby v. Harris, 27 F. (2d) 942 (S.D. Tex. 1928); Nixon v. Condon,
34 F. (2d) 464 (W. D. Tex. 1929) ; cf. West v. Bliley, 33 F. (2d) 177 (E.D.
Va. 1929).
"Ex parte Virginia, 1oo U. S.339 (1879) ; Virginia v. Rives, ioo U. S.
313 (1879) ; Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323, 46 Sup. Ct. 521 (19-6).

'The locus classicus for the expression of this sentiment has become
Waples v. Marrast, loS Tex. 5,11, 184 S.W. 180, 183 (1916) ; see State v.
Steward, 64 Mont. 453, 459 et seq., 2io Pac. 465, 468 (1922). In the principal
case these "inherent powers" of the party were "recognized but not created"
by the statute. The same result, therefore, would have been reached by application of the common lA~w of Texas. The court, however, ignores the fact that
the Legislature did try to control in at least two particulars, for the statute in
the very section in question (note 1, supra) provided that n.,person shall ever
be denied the right to participate in a primary because of foraer political views,
or because of membership in organizations other than the Political party. See
this contention undeservedly ignored in the case of Grigsb3 v. Harris, supra
note 3.
' Chandler v. Neff, 298 F. 515 (W. D. Tex. 1924). In N nwberry v. U. S.
256 U. S. 232, 250, 4 Sup. Ct. 469, 472 (1921) it is said, "Moi "over, they (primaries) are in no sense an election for an office, but merely n -thods by which
party adherents agree upon candidates whom they intend to o fer and support
for ultimate choice by all qualified electors."
Sargent, The Law of Primary Elections (1918) 2 MIN.. L. REv. 97, IOI

et seq. gives an excellent survey of the conflicting cases on tiis point. The
Illinois cases supporting the scarce view that primaries are "elections" are reviewed and attacked by Greely, Last Illbois Primary Law Decision (igog) 4
ILL L. REV. 227.
'Nixon v. Condon, stpra note 3. This argument apparently derives much
weight from the fact that primaries were unknown when the amendments were
adopted. The answer to this often-used formulary panacea is found in the
words of Chief Justice Marshall, that this is a Constitution which is being
interpreted, and therefore, flexibility rather than rigidity should be the keynote.
'These principles all find place in Nixon v. Condon, supra; note 3. In the
principal case the brief opinion emphasizes particularly the fact that in Texas
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may be compounded with surprising effect to produce the result reached in
the principal case. If a reasoning based on rigid adherence to the letter is the
goal of our law, and the desire for legal symmetry is to prevail, then there is
little to cavil with in such a result. Mere utterance of the formula that a primary is only a nomination should not be permitted, however, to minimize or
dismiss the cardinal importance of such an institution as the primary election.
When a nomination takes place by the method of primary election, the right to
vote at such a primary is as fundamental as the right to vote at the general
election to which the primary is a prelude. In such a case the right to elect
includes the right to nominate;1 0 the two become so welded and riveted together
as to form an inseparable whole. This is peculiarly true where one party
has such effectual mastery in a locality as to render a nomination as candidate
of the dominant party a virtual election-'
Further, the influence of parties is
a militant one; and they have, in their present heyday, become so mixed in the
cogs of political machinery as to make them a vital concern to the state itself.
If necessary, these parties, which represent the essence of our political life,
should be made governmental bodies and subjected to firm statutory control.1 '
It seems anomalous to permit a political party to trample a right granted by
the Constitution, and to have courts use as a safety-valve the argument that such
parties are not governmental agencies. The holding of the principal case should
be repudiated; it is based on a species of reasoning that looks more to the
form and the letter, than to the spirit and the substance, of matters."
"the Democratic Party pays its own expenses, and is in fact no sort of a
governmental instrumentality" although they have been "regulated-however
elaborately-as to how they shall elect their nominees." See note 13, infra.
But if primaries are regulated by statute, and the state defrays the expenses
thereof, then a result contra to that of principal case is reached, even though
it be optional with the party to follow such statutory primary, West v. Bliley,
SuPra note 3. The sole and tenuous distinction between the cases is apparently
the fact of state payment for the expenses of party operation.
10"It i§ therefore true, . .. , that the right to vote necessarily involves the
right to nominate, and that the right to nominate is an essential and inseparable
part of the right to vote. The right to nominate therefore becomes a constitutional right, . . .," Meechem, Primary Election Legislation (1905) 3 MICH. L.
Ray. 364, 367; see Comm. v. Willcox, III Va. 849, 859, 69 S. E. 1027, io3i
(i91i).
"2"In the southern states victory in such a primary, on the Democratic
side, is practically the equivalent of an election, as there is but one effective
party in that section of the country," MERRIAN, PRIMARY ELECTIONS (1908)
83; see Leonard v. Comm., 112 Pa. 6o7, 625 (1886).
'Tuttle, Political Parties and Their Primaries (i903) 1 MICH. L. REv.
466, 495.
1 The "inherent powers" of parties are not, as suggested obiter in the principal case, "beyond statutory control." See note 5, supra.
"TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (925), art. 3107: "In no event shall a negro be
eligible to participate in a Democratic party primary election held in the State
of Texas . . . " was declared unconstitutional in Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S.
536, 47 Sup. Ct. 446 (927).
The present statute in effect, if one may argue
post facta, is merely a euphemism for the old; or, if we grant the argument
that the statute is merely declaratory of a party's inherent powers (see note 5,
supra), we have this quaint situation: a group closely connected with the very
life of the state is permitted to do that which the state might not itself do.

RECENT CASES
CORPORATIONS-USE OF PROXIES IN DETERMINING A QUORUM-EFFECT OF
WITHDRAWAL OF PROXY HOLDER FROM CORPORATE MEETING-At the time set for
a regularly called shareholders' meeting, the president and a number of share-

holders assembled at the appointed place. The proxies held by the proxy committee, of which the president was a member, were essential to the existence of a
quorum.

The president asked for a roll-call and shareholders clamored for the

election of a chairman. During the ensuing excitement, the president stated
that he held a large number of proxies. By a preponderant viva voce vote, a
shareholder was designated as chairman of the meeting. Thereupon the president and other members of the proxy committee withdrew from the place
of meeting. The subsequent proceedings are attacked on the ground that no
quorum was present. Held, that the shares and proxies of the committee were
present for the purposes of a quorum, on the grounds (I) that the meeting had
started before the committee withdrew, and (2) that the proxy-holders were
present as agents as well as in their individual capacities as shareholders.
Duffy v. Loft Candy Co. Inc., 151 Atl. 223 (Del. i93o).
Although it is well settled that a shareholder may not break a quorum
by withdrawing after a meeting has begun,' it would seem that he may prevent
a quorum from arising by withdrawing before the meeting has been called to
The court's conclusion in the instant case that the meeting had started
order
before the proxy committee withdrew, appears highly debatable on the facts
presented.3 Even i'f the members of the proxy committee are assumed to have
been present in their individual capacity as shareholders, for the purpose of
determining a quorum, it has been held that proxies should not be counted
12 THOMiPSON, CoRORTION S (3d ed. 1927) § IOIO; Hexter v. Columbia
Baking Co., 145 AtI. 115 (Del. 1929) (unjustifiable withdrawal); Commonwealth er rel. Sheip et al. v. Vandegrift et al. 232 Pa. 53, 81 Atl. i5z (1911)

(capricious withdrawal).
- Cf. Leamy et al. v. Sinaloa Exploration and Development Co. et al, 15
Del. Ch. 28, 13o AtI. 282 (1925), where it was held that a shareholder may not
be counted for quorum purposes, even in his individual capacity, at a regularly
convened meeting, when he is present for the express purpose of protesting
against the purported illegality of the meeting. Thus the possible question
presents itself as to whether, in the instant case, the protests of the president
against the alleged illegality of the procedure of the meeting, could not also
operate to prevent him from being counted for quorum purposes. (It should
be noted that the court in the principal case makes no attempt to determine at
what moment the assembled group assumed the legal characteristics of a
"meeting.")
This conclusion cannot be supported unless the proxy committee was acting
in its representative capacity, so that sufficient stock was present for a quorum,
without which there could be no meeting. The court in deciding that the committee was acting in its representative capacity first said that in a solicited agency
of this sort only slight evidence is needed to support the conclusion that the
agents were acting as such and not as individuals, and then ruled as a matter
of law that the two following facts were sufficient evidence: (a) at one point
in the aforementioned dispute the president declared that he represented a great
number of proxies, and (b) one of the proxy committee not being a stockholder
himself, could not have been present at the meeting in any other capacity than
as an agent. Whether the court is justified in its conclusion from the evidence
is questionable.
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4
for quorum purposes until filed with the appropriate corporate official. In view
never
were
committee
the
of
of the fact that in the instant case the proxies
so offered, the conclusion as to the validity of the proceedings is logically questionable. The decision is, however, probably sound in the interest of settling
costly intra-corporate friction in accordance with the desires of the apparent
majority.

CRIMINAL LAw-HoMICIDE-AccIDENTAL

KILLING IN

COM

ISSION OF A

FELONY-During a prison riot, one of the defendants, all three of whom were
acting in concert with other inmates, shot and killed a confederate while scuffling
with a guard. A statute made it a felony to attempt an escape from prison.'
Held, that, even though the killing was accidental, defendants were guilty
of first degree murder for killing in the commission of a felony.' People v.
Uduin et al., 254 N. Y. 255, 172 N. E. 489 (193o).

At early common law, any killing perpetrated in the commission of a felony
was murder.' Some English judges' and a recent text writer' suggest that
the rule should be that accidental killing shall only be murder when it occurs
in the commission of those felonious acts known to be dangerous to life and
likely in themselves to cause death. This rule, in effect, would require a causal
relationship between the act constituting the felony and the homicide, based on
the probable consequence of such an act to cause death. Several American
States have passed statutes declaring that homicide, amounting to what would
have been murder at common law, done in the7 commission of a few enumerated
felonies," shall be murder of the first degree. Accordingly, a mere accidental
killing, even in the commission of one of the designated felonies, would not be
sufficient to constitute murder in the first degree under these statutes, unless
the act of killing would have been murder at common law exclusive of the
felony Other states, including New York, still maintain that homicide done
'In re Gulla,

13 Del. Ch. 23, 115 Atl. (1921).

who attempts
N. Y. PENAL LAW (Cahill, 1923) § 1695, "A prisoner ....
felony."
, although unsuccessfully, to escape from such prison, is guilty of to
affect
Ibid. § IO44, "The killing of a human being, . . . without a design
a
death by a person engaged in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit,
felony, . . . is . . . murder in the first degree."
3I
STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883) 463-465.
'See Regina v. Horsey, 3 Fost. & F. 287, 288 (I862) ; Regina v. Serne,
1

16 Cox, C. C. 311, 313 (1887) ; Regina v. Whitemarsh, 6z J. P. 711, 712 (1898);

Rex v. Beard, [192o] A. C. 479, 493.
6l WHARTON, HOMICIDE (3d ed. 1907) § 92.
or
"Usually limited to "the graver felonies, like arson, robbery, burglary,
rape," CLARK, CRIMINAL LAW (Mikell's ed. 1915) 217.
It is to be noted that the legislators may have recognized the importance
of a causation, shown by experience, in making up this group; that opposition
to the consummation of these enumerated felonies will probably be met by fatal
resistance. See felonies enumerated ibid.
"State v. Bobbitt, 215 Mo. 10, 114 S. W. 511 (T9o8) ; State v. Mangana,
S. E.
33 Nev. 511, 112 Pac. 693 (191o) ; State v. Dalton, 178 N. C. 779, 101 1912)
LAW (iith ed.
548 (1919); for construction see I WHARTON, CRIMINAL
§ 510. Contra: Commonwealth v. Lessner, 274 Pa. 1o8 (1922).
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in the commission of any felony shall be first degree nmrder,' and this is true
though the killing be accidental. 0 However, where the accidental, causation of
death arises from a fact entirely distinct from the act which constitutes the
felony, it is a question whether or not a conviction of murder in the first
degree would still be sustained.

One court has held in the negative," on the

ground that the felonious act was not "in itself directly and naturally dangerous to life," and another has expressed a willingness to construe a statute in
favor of the accused.' The courts have uniformly upheld convictions of first
degree murder where death was caused while attempting to escape from prison
in violation of statutes making such an attempt a felony," but the killings have
not been accidental in the cases on record. However, the fact of the accidental
causation of the homicide would not warrant a holding different from that

expressed in the principal case, either on the general principles discussed herein,
or on the humanly sound policy of criminal responsibility expressed by Justice
Stephen in an old English case,"4 that a criminal actor must be held to have
"risked his own life as well as that of others."
CRIMINAL

PRocaDuRE-HABITAL-CRiMINAL

STATUTES-SuSPENDED

SEN-

ONE OF REQUiS1R CONVICTrIONs-Relator, having pleaded guilty to
felonies on three occasions but sentence having been twice suspended, was convicted of a fourth felony. Under the New York statute,' a person convicted
of a fourth felony, after having been convicted three times of felonies,
shall be sentenced to life imprisonment. Held (Cardozo, C. J. dissenting, in an
opinion in which Pound and Crane, JJ. concur), that where sentence has been
suspended, the offender has not been convicted within the meaning of the statute. People ex rel. Marcley v. Lawes, 254 N. Y. 249, 172 N. E. 487 (1930)*
The problem of whether a suspended sentence' is effective as a conviction
under a statute such as that in issue, adjudicated for the first time in the
TENCE AS

'State v. Williams, go Conn. 126, 96 Atl. 370 (I916) ; Morgan v. State,
51 Neb. 672, 71 N. W. 788 (1897) ; People v. Spohr, 206 N. Y. 516, IOO N. E.
444 (1912) ; and see CLARK, op. cit. supra note 5, at 42.
0As decided in the principal case.

"People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, igg N. W. 373 (1924) (violation of
liquor law not common law felony, but merely malun prohibitum). But see
State v. Robinett, 279 S. W. 696 (Mo. 1926) (transporting mash).
"State v. Diebold, 277 Pac. 394, 152 Wash. 68 (1929) (statute making it
a felony merely to take car without consent).
"Miller v. State, 145 Ala. 677, 40 So. 47 (igo6) (attempt to blow up prison
gate) ; State v. Vaughn, 200 Mo. I, 98 S. W. 2 (iqo6) (warden shot in attempted escape); People v. Flanigan, 174 N. Y. 356, 66 N. E. 988 (19o3)
(keeper died of assault).
" Regina v. Serne, sutpra note 4, at 313.

IN. Y. PENAL LAW (1923) c. 41, S11942.
2 Cf. Scrivnor v. State, 20 S. W. (2d) 416 (1929) ; (i29) 78 U. OF PA.
L. Rzv. 561 (effect of pardon under habitual-criminal statutes).
'State v. Osborne, 79 N. J. Eq. 430, 82 Ad. 424 (1912) (excellent for
divergent views on a court's power to suspend sentence); People v. Rattigan,
157 N. Y. Supp. 1003, 1007 (915), "It cannot be argued that the suspension
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principal case, is of interest to those jurisdictions" where legislation similar to
the so-called Bannes Law' of New York makes it a question of importance.
A split of opinion exists at common law as to the meaning of the term "conviction." Some courts hold that there has been a conviction at the moment a
verdict has been returned or a plea of guilty entered; 0 others say that this is not
sufficient to constitute a conviction, but that in addition sentence must have
bten rendered.7 The court in the principal case, however, had no choice under
the statute, which clearly provides for conviction where sentence has been suspended.' Nevertheless, the result reached by the court requires sentence in
order to convict. The difficulty encountered, is that of applying the recent socalled fourth-offender statutes to facts which warrant as a matter of justice,
perhaps, that the accused be relieved of the penalty. The present decision is unfortunate as a precedent since it fails to lay a basis upon which future decisions
may be validly reached in that the rigidity of the statute remains and the discretion, on which the efficacy of these statutes depends in application,' is still
unsecured. It seems unwise for courts, in spite of the desirability of the result
from a humane viewpoint, to determine that the more immediate end to be sought
is the exception of a particular factual situation rather than the preservation of
the totality of the statute, since the legislature has expressed a clear intention
to include such a situation within the scope of the statute's operation. While an
objective based on humanitarian principles is meritorious, the means to achieve
it, in the instant case, should rest solely with the legislative branch of government."
wipes out the guilt of the offense, or places the offender in his original position prior to his conviction
. . "; CLARK, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Mikell's
ed. 1918) § 187.
ICAL. PFN. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 644 as amended by CAL, CODES AND
GEN. LAws (Supp. 1927) § 644, pI 224; PA. STAT. (Supp. i929) P. L. 373,
p. 854 (punishment for fourth felony imposed at court's discretion) ; I WASH.
CoMP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 2286; XW.VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c.
152, §§ 23, 24.

'Baumes,
(1927)
6

The Bazones Law and the Legislative Program.in New York

52 A. B. A. REP. 511; Note (1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 752.

Quintard v. Knoedler, 53 Conn. 485, 2 Atl. 752 (i885) ; People v. Adams,
95 Mich. 541, 55 N. W. 461 (1893) ; Corn. v. Blair, 25 Gratt. 850 (Va. I874)
7
State v. Barnes, 24 Fla. 153, 4 So. 56o (1888); Com. v. Dial, 142 Ky.
32, 133 S. W. 976 (1911); Corn. v. McDermott, 224 Pa. 363, 73 Atl. 427
(19o9). Final sentence, when made the ground of disability, is often required
before conviction: Com. v. Kiley, i5o Mass. 325, 23 N. E. 55 (i89o); 2
BIs o, CVrneNAI LAw (9th ed. 1923) 723. But cf. People v. Rattigan, siuprw
note 3.
'People v. Rattigan, supra note 3; N. Y. CODE CIM. PRec. (1928)
§ 47o-b (a second offender may be one against whom sentence, upon a prior
plea of guilty, has been suspended) ; ibid. § 517 (appeal lies from a conviction
where sentence has been suspended) ; People v. Rugg, 98 N. Y. 537 (i885) ;
see dissent by Cardozo, C. J. in the principal case, at 489. A result consistent
with that of the suspended sentence must follow where a former sentence was
void: People v. Adams, supra note 6.
'Note (929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 798 (severity and evasion).
" People v. Gowalsky, 244 N. Y. 451, 466, i55 N. E. 737, 742 (1927).
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EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL EVIDENCE TO SHOW LACK OF CONORAL INDUCING PROmISES-The defendants

SIDERATION-CONTEMPORANEOUS

were co-makers of a promissory note, the recited consideration being "for value
received." The trial court, over the protest of the plaintiff, allowed evidence
of a contemporaneous oral agreement by which the plaintiff promised not to
hold defendants liable on the note. Held, that the evidence was admissible,
since lack of consideration may be shown by extrinsic evidence. Richardson
v.Lamp, 2o Pac. 14 (Cal. 193o).
The principal case is an excellent example of the attempts often made
by litigants to avoid the prohibitions of the parol evidence rule by offering
on trial what they terin evidence of whether there is any consideration for the
instrument, when in reality, what they are showing is a contemporaneous oral
promise which induced the execution of the writing. Since "there are very
few terms of a contract that cannot be characterized as consideration for entering into the agreement,"' such attempts are, as in the principal case, aften
successful. The court here failed to distinguish between what was solely an
inducing promise, and what was the consideration for the note. Had the evidence in question been for the sole purpose of showing lack of consideration
for the note in the case, the holding of the court would have been correct 2 The
consideration for the note was formally recited as "for value received." Such
an instrument clearly indicates that the whole consideration was not reduced to
writing. Therefore, allowing the actual consideration to be shown, merely
results in explaining the indefinite formal recital. However, the evidence
actually showed only the existence of an oral promise which induced the execution of the note, and as such, was wrongfully admitted, since it varied and contradicted the unqualified promise to pay 3 as expressed on the face of the note.'
Such evidence comes under the prohibition of the parol evidence rule. Recent
decisions in Pennsylvania,0 departing from the so-called "Pennsylvania Excep"Harrison, Admissibility of Parol Evidence to Alter Recital of ConsideraL. Q. 217, 229.
-Wells v. Drane, 206 Ala. 583, 9o So. 898 (I92I) ; Dunston v. Smith Seed
Co., 26 Ga. App. 585, lo6 S. E. 914 (1921) ; Peabody v. Munson, 211 Ill.
324,
71 N. E xoo6 (1904) ; 4 JONES, COMIMENTARIES ON EvIDENcE (1926) § 1561;
I JoycE, DEFENCES TO COMMERCIAL PAPER (2d ed. 1924) § 317.
3
BIGELoW, THE LAW OF Biurs, NOTES AND CHECKS (2d ed. 19oo) ii. It is
settled by other authorities also that the promise must be unconditional.
'Arthur v. Brown, 91 S.C. 316, 74 S.E. 652 (i9,2) held that no authority
would allow defendant to "prove by parol evidence that the written promise was
no promise, and was to have no force or effect of any kind."
tLion (1928) 2 TEmPLE

Lompoc Valley Bank v. Stephenson, 156 Cal. 35o, 1O4 PacL 449 (19o9);

Harwood v. Brown, 23 Mo. App. 69 (x886) ; Security Savings Bank v. Rhodes,
1o7 Neb. 223, 185 N. W. 421, 2o A. L. R. 412 (192); Statnaker v. Tolbert,
121 S.C 437, 114 S.E. 412 (1922); 5 WIGmIoRE, EVIDEN-E, (2d ed. 1923)
§ 2444.

'Second National Bank v. Yeager, 268 Pa. 167, 111 Atl. 159 (1920);
Gianni v. Russell, 281 Pa. 320, i26 At. 791 (1924) : If the writing is so stated
"so as to form a complete legal obligation without any mistake as to the object
or extent of the instrument," such parol evidence as oral inducing promises, is
inadmissible. First National Bank v. Sagerson, 283 Pa. 406, 129 At. 333 (1925) ;
First National Bank v. Purcell, 284 Pa. 355, 131 Atl. 239 (1925) ; U. S. National Bank v. Evans, 296 Pa. 541, 146 AtI. 126 (1929).
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tion,"' come to the same conclusion. Since any inducing promise is so easily
mistaken for part of the consideration of the instrument, such actually inadmissible evidence can very easily be advanced and often is, under the guise of
showing lack of consideration. Therefore, courts should scan such evidence very
carefully to determine whether what it actually tends to prove is lack or failure
of consideration.

FUTURE INTERESTS-ASSIGNABILITY OF EXPECTANCIES BY PROSPECTIVE HEIR

DIEVISE-STATUS OF RIGHTS ASSIGNED--TO secure debt to bank, defendant
executed assignment of expectancy in his father's estate. Subsequently defendant
son filed petition in bankruptcy and was in due course discharged. Bank took
no part in bankruptcy proceedings. Between the date of the filing of the petition and the discharge, the father died, devising an interest in certain realty
to the defendant. Plaintiff, assignee of bank, brought this action to foreclose
son's interest in bequest. Held, that discharge in bankruptcy discharged assignment as well as personal liability on the debt. Gannom v. Graham, 231 N. W.
OR

675 (Iowa 193o).

The rule is well settled at law that the spes successionis or expectancy
of an heir apparent is not assignable.' In the majority of jurisdictions, however,
equity will enforce such assignments, made in good faith and for a valuable
consideration, when the expectancy has ripened into an interest in possession.'In order to appreciate fully the conservative views of the law on the transferrability of expectancies, reference should be made to the rules governing
contingent remainders. Since a contingent remainder was not considered an
estate at common law, it was at first held to be inalienable.' Later the movement in favor of the free alienation of property resulted in the enactment
of statutes expressly allowing the transfer of contingent remainders.' In some
jurisdictions the same result has been attained by judicial decision without legis'The Pennsylvania exception stood for the proposition that contemporaneous
parol, inducing promises could be put into evidence even though they varied the
terms of the contract, Wallace v. Backer, I Binney 6to (i8o9); Gandy v.
Weckerly, 220 Pa. 285, 69 Atl. 858 (19o8) ; Potter v. Grimm, 248 Pa. 440, 94
Ad. 185 (1915). Discussions of the past and present status of Pennsylvania
decisions will be found in Folz, Pennsylvania Ride as to Admissibility of Evidence to Establish CLntemporaiwous Inducing Promises to Affect Written Instrtments (1904) 52 Am. L. RE. 6oi; Harrison (1925) 74 U. OF PA. L. REV.
235, in an article for which he adopts the same title as Folz, ibid.
"Jones v. Roe, 3 T. R. 88, 93 (1789);

Carleton v. Leighton, 3 Mer. 667

(18o5); Allcard v. Walker, [1896] 2 Ch. 669; WILLIAMS, REAL PROPERTY
(24th ed. 1926) IOO n.
'Hobson v. Trevor, 2 P. Wins. 191 (1723) ; 3 PomRoY, EQUIrY JuErsPRUDENCE (4th ed. igi8) § 1285 et seq.; Note (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 215.
28

'Den. d. Hopper v. Demarest, 21 N. J.L. 525 (1848); Striker v. Mott,
82 (1863) ; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (19o3) § 129b.
'ALA. CODE (1907) § 3398; N. Y. CONSOLIDATED LAWS (1909) ch. 52

N. Y.

§ 58.
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lative sanction? The rule has never been extended to include the expectancy
of a prospective heir or devisee, for the reason that although a contingent
remainder may be but a possibility, it is nevertheless an interest, while the
expectancy is not.0 However, in jurisdictions where the assignment of expectancies is held valid in equity further problems arise as to the nature of the
rights created by such assignments. In at least four jurisdictions' courts have
been called upon to decide the nature of the rights assigned, under the National
Bankruptcy Act. This Act exempts from its operation and preserves all liens
created by the bankrupt, rendering these secured claims enforceable after the
discharge 3 Has the assignee of an expectancy such a lien as will entitle him
to the benefit of this exception when the ancestor dies after the date of the
9
filing of the petition? Courts in California, Illinois," and England,' after
decided the question in the
have
problem,
of
the
studies
exhaustive
making
affirmative. The court in the principal case reached a contrary result on the
theory that the assignment created no lien but merely an executory contract
which was enforceable only so long as the debt for which it was given as
security continued to exist. Since the discharge of the defendant extinguished
the debt, the assignment perished with it. This view sets at naught the intention of the parties to secure the claim of the creditor. The conclusion of the
court hardly seems justified, since it has been established that the assignment
which is enforceable in bankof an expectancy does create a valid equitable lien
2
In addition it has been held
ruptcy under the exemption clause of the Act
that the continued existence of the debt is unnecessary to the enforcement of
m
" For these reasons, it is felt that the decision in the principal case
the lien.
is unfortunate, departing as it does from established principles and from the
modern tendency in favor of the greater alienability of interests in property.

MORTGAGES-ACCELERATING PROVISION-FORFEITURE FOR NEGLIGENT DELAY
ItY MORTGAGOR IN' MAKING INTEREST PAYmENT-A mortgage clause provided

that the principal should become due at the mortgagee's option after a default
of twenty days in the payment of interest. The secretary of the defendant company, mortgagor, through an error, mailed in an interest check for an amount less
than that due. The secretary notified the mortgagee of the error, and informed
5Dunn v. Sargent, IO Mass. 336 (1869) ; Brown v. Fulkerson, 125 Mo.
400 (1894) ; (1914) 28 HARv. L. REV. 191.
6 VLuIAms, loc. cit. supra note I.
7Bridge v. Kedon, 163 Cal. 493, 126 Pac. 149 (1912) ; Dumont, Roberts Co.

v. McDougal, 2oo Ill. App. 583 (1916); Re Lind. [19151 2 Chan. 345.
330 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 107 (1926).
' Bridge v. Kedon, supra note 7.
"0Dumont, Roberts Co. v. McDougal, supra note 7.
"Re Lind, .ipra note 7.
"Thompson v. Richardson, 5I N. D. 241, igg N. W. 863 (924) ; 3 PoERoy, op cit. .upra note 2, § i2gi.
-Parker v. Muggridge, 2 Story 334 (C. C. N. H. 1842); Fletcher V.
Morey, 2 Story 555 (C. C. Mass. 1843); 3 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 2,

§ 1288n(f).
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him that it would be corrected when the president of the defendant company
returned from a business trip, fifteen days before the lapse of the grace period.
The secretary neglected to tell the president o.f the error, and the difference
was not mailed to the mortgagee within the twenty day period. On the twentyfirst day, the latter brought foreclosure proceedings, and insisted upon his
rights, notwithstanding a tender by the defendant. Held, (reversing judgments
for defendant in both lower courts, Cardozo, C. J. dissenting, in an opinion
concurred in by Kellogg and Lehman, JJ.) that such a mistake, though unintentional, was no ground for relief in equity. Graf et al. v. Hope Bldg. Corporatimo, 171 N. E. 884 (N. Y. 193o).

Acceleration clauses of the type used in the principal case are universally
held to be valid,' and courts of equity will not lend their aid to delinquent
mortgagors on the ground that the provision operates as a penalty or forfeiture.The mortgagee will be allowed to pursue his remedy, notwithstanding a plea
by the mortgagor of his willingness and ability to pay, and that it was only
due to negligence or inadvertance that he did not fulfill the conditions of the
covenant.? Equity will only relieve the debtor where the mortgagee has been
guilty of fraudulent conduct, or where the latter has done some act or made
some declaration, which would render it unconscionable for him to take advantage of the situation.' The problem presented in the principal case could be
I For collection of authorities, see 2 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928)
§§ 94, 1503; I WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE (4th ed. 1927) § 56. The
motive of the mortgagee in foreclosing is immaterial, Lotterer v. Leon, 138
Md. 318, 113 Atl. 887 (1g92).
And a partial payment will not deprive
the mortgagee of his right under the covenant, Smith v. Hooten, 3 Pa. Dist.
Rep. 25o (1894). Similarly, a tender, after default, is of no avail to the mortgagor, Swearingen v. Lahner, 93 Iowa 147, 61 N. W. 431 (1894), a leading case,
in which the court thoroughly discusses the general question of acceleration.
No demand is necessary after the default, Dean v. Applegarth, 65 Cal. 391, 4 Pac.
375 (884) ; the bringing of the foreclosure suit is a sufficient demand, Thronateeska Pecan Co. v. Matthews, 277 Fed. 361 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921).
2

Dunn v. Barry, 35 Cal. App. 325, 169 Pac. 91o (917)

; Lotterer v. Leon,

supra note i; Noyes v. Anderson, 124 N. Y. 175, 26 N. E. 316 (189).
In
2 JONES, op cit. supra note x, § 1511, the author says: "Such a provision in a
mortgage is not considered a penalty, but an agreement as to the time when
the debt shall become due, enforceable according to its terms." For historical
discussion of the law on penalties and forfeitures, see Loyd, Pehalrieg and Forfeitures (1915) 29 HAnv. L REv. 117.
'Collins v. Nagel, 2oo Iowa 562, 2o3 N. W. 702 (1925) ; Serrell v. Rothstein, 49 N. J.Eq. 385, 24 AtI. 369 (1892) ; Cunningham v. McCready, 219 Pa.
594, 69 At]. 82 (io8) ; cf. Petterson v. Weinstock, lo6 Conn. 436, 138 At.
433 (1927). Equity is not concerned with the resultant hardship, Ferris v.
Ferris, 28 Barb. 29 (N. Y. x858). However, the rule is different in respect
to non-payment of taxes and assessments, Smalley v. Rankin, 85 Iowa 612, 52
N. W. 5o7 (1892) ; Noyes v. Anderson, supra note 2. Contra: Derechinsky v.
Epstein, 98 N. J. Eq. 79,

13o

At. 720 (1925).

'Kerbauh v. Nugent, 48 Ind. App. 43, 95 N. E. 336 (1x1); Strange v.
Rosenberg, ioi Misc. 618, 167 N. Y. Supp. 838 (917); Wilson v. Bird, 28
N. J.Eq. 352 (877); Tibbets v. Bush & Lane Co., iii Wash. 165, 189 Pac.
996 (1920).
In an old New York case, Broderick v. Smith, 15 How. Pr. 434 (N. Y.
1858), the court would not allow foreclosure proceedings on the ground of
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disposed of without any difficulty by a strict application of the principles set
forth above. The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Cardozo, however, raises
some points that compel attention, but the majority of the court saw fit,
apparently, to ignore them. The majority opinion indicated that the mortgagee
was not guilty of any unconscionable conduct, for he did nothing affirmatively.
But it seems that the mortgagee's failure to act, under the circumstances, warrants equitable intervention, at least to the extent that equity should not aid
him in obtaining his purely technical equitable relief. Equity has taken such
steps in matters not far afield; for example, it has refused to allow strict
enforcement of the acceleration clause in regard to accidental non-payment of
taxes and assessments
A New York court' refused to accelerate the debt in
a case where alterations were made, contrary to the terms of an accelerating
clause in the mortgage, because the alterations were not substantial and the
security of the mortgagee was unimpairped. These reasons apply with equal
force to the instant case, as Chief Justice Cardozo so cogently points out.7 Yet,
the New York court cannot be said to have departed from prevailing equitable
principles; it merely has refused to follow the spirit of equity. And, finally,
some consideration seems to be due the almost universal custom of the notification by the mortgagee as to the day the interest is due, especially in a case of
this sort, where justice can best be served by the imposition upon the mortgagee of an "equitable duty"' to demand payment.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONs-SUFFICIENCY

OF THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF A

DEBTto ToL THE STATUTE-In a suit upon a promissory note on which the
Statute of Limitations had run, the plaintiff offered -in evidence letters of the
unconscionable conduct. The mortgagee had contracted to remove a judgment
lien from the property, the lien being for an amount four times that of the interest due. The mortgagee did remove the lien, but did not tell the mortgagor.
The interest remained unpaid at the end of the grace period, and the mortgagee attempted to foreclose. The court refused to lend its aid, saying that the
mortgagee should have told the debtor of the cancellation, and that not to do so
and then attempt to foreclose was "oppressive and unreasonable conduct." The
court in Ferris v. Ferris, suprc note 3, a case which is quoted at length in the
principal case, refers to the Broderick case as one involving trickery and
oppressive conduct. Now, Ferris v. Ferris is a case of respectable authority
in New York. Yet it refers to a mortgagee's failure to notify a mortgagor
of the removal of a judgment lien (an act which the mortgagee was not legally
obliged to do until more than two weeks after the grace period had elapsed)
as oppressionable conduct, conduct sufficient to relieve the mortgagor of his
default. Ferris v. Ferris is itself cited with approval in the principal case.
The mortgagee's conduct in the instant case seems to be at least as unconscionable
as that of the mortgagee in Broderick v. Smith.
ISee cases cited supra note 3; see also Trowbridge v. Malex Realty Corp.,
ig App. Div. 656, I9i N. Y. Supp. 97 (1921).
0
Loughery v. Catalano, iI7 Misc. 393, 191 N. Y. Supp. 436 (1921).
171 N. E. at 888, 889.
'Note the following statement made by Cardozo, C. J. in the dissenting
opinion in the principal case, 171 N. E. at 888: "The consequence does not follow
that, in conditions so peculiar, the omission to make demand is without significance in equity."
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defendant stating that the note was his, that he was unable to pay, that he was
endeavoring to effect a sale of property, which "will simplify my position considerably," and that he would call on plaintiff to "arrange!' about the note "on
the best possible terms." Held, that these letters tolled the Statute. Hayden v.
InternationalBanking Corporation,41 F. (2d) io7 (Ct.of App. D. C. 193o).
For a century the rule has been regarded as established: (I) that only
a new promise to pay a debt barred by the Statute of Limitations will revive the
obligation to pay;' and (2) that a promise to pay on demand is to be implied
from an acknowledgment of the debt as a present obligation, unless accompanyAn
ing statements of the debtor make such an implication unreasonable
express refusal to pay has almost invariably prevented a promise from being
3
inferred under this rule But a statement that the debtor is unable to pay
has been generally considered incapable of rebutting or qualifying the implication of a promise, if coupled with an express acknowledgment of indebtedness,'
on the ground that inability to pay does not necessarily negative a promise to
pay.' A contrary conclusion, however, has been often reached by decisions
pointing out that it is unreasonable to presumne that a man unconditionally
6
Other
promises to pay even an admitted debt which he says he cannot pay.
was that
test
proper
the
that
cases have taken a middle ground and have said
would
of willingness or intention to pay:' so that if it appears that the debtor
then the
not pay were he able, and only resorts to inability as an excuse,
it appears that
acknowledgment will be insufficient to raise a promise; but if
may be imthe debtor would pay were he able then a promise to pay on demand
against a
maintained
be
can
suit
no
Since
acknowledgment.'
plied from the
ability
his
unless
able,"
debtor who expressly promises to pay "when he becomes
Tanner v.
' Shepherd v. Thompson, 122 U. S.231, 7 Sup. Ct 1229 (1887) ;
Smart, 6 B. & C. 6o3 (Eng. 1827).
; Palmer v. Gillespie,
' Custy v. Donlan, 159 Mass. 245, 34 N. E. 36o (1883)
95 Pa. 340 (88o).
v. Cross, 3 Bing.
3Cosio v. Guerra, 67 Fla. 331, 65 So. 5 (914) ; A'Court
329 (Eng. 1825).

'Strong v. Andros, 34 App. D. C. 278 (igio); Olcott v. Scales, 3 Vt.
by itself constitute
5A statement that the debtor is unable to pay does not
v. Stillto raise an implied promise to pay, Hazlett
an acknowledgment sufficient
wagen, 23 Pa. Super. 114 (1903); Luna v. Ellsby, 6 S. W. (2d) 375 (Tex.
173 (1831) ; Spencer v. Hemmerde, [1922] 2 A. C. 507.

1928).

Contra: Beeler v. Clarke 90 Md.

221,

44 Atl. lO38 (1899).

Bullion & Exchange Bank v. Hgler, 93 Fed. 89o (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1899);
337 (1852).
Atwood v. Coburn, 4 N. H. 315 (1828) ; Airy v. Smith, I Phila.
v. Kreuger,
Kreuger
;
(1904)
595
E.
N.
7o
17,
Ill.
' Walker v. Freeman, 2o9
; Howard v. Windom, 86
(statute not tolled)But
(890)
1004
W.
S.
12
178,
Tex.
76
see Lord Sumner, in
Tex. 560, 26 S. W. 483 I894) (statute tolled).
Spencer v. Hemmerde, supra note 4, at 525, to the effect that the debtor's
intention to pay is immaterial.
pay will
'In Missouri, a statement that the debtor will never be able to App. 256
prevent any promise from being implied, Kirkbride v. Gash, 34 Mo. will
make
(I889). But a statement that the debtor is unable to pay at present
117
Hargrave,
v.
Wells
pay,
to
ability
debtor's
the
on
conditional
promise
the
Mo. 563, 23 S.W. 885 (1893) ; cf. Chidsey v. Powell, 91 Mo. 622, 4 S.W. 446
(1887).

RECENT CASES
subsequent to promising be proved,9 it seems inconsistent to allow suit without
such proof where the debtor says he cannot pay the money which he admits he
owes1
To do so is to make a promise implied from an acknowledgment more
effective to toll the Statute than an express promise, and, therefore, to make
the acknowledgment, instead of the promise, the essential factor in tolling
the Statute,u a result which the court in the principal case frankly admits it
has reached.'
Such a holding seems proper only if the Statute be construed
as merely raising a presumption of payment, whereas, by the great weight
of modem authority, the Statute is to be interpreted as extinguishing the obligation becaused passed "for quieting of men's estates, and avoiding of suits.''
Since in the District of Columbia the Statute bars suit after the unusually
'
short period of three years," it is probable that the "presumption of payment!'
construction influences decisions there more readily than in jurisdictions where
e
the creditor has a longer period in which to bring suit. '

TAXATION-CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF TAXING ESTATE BY THE ENTIRETY AS

PART OF GROSS ESTATE OF DECEDENT HuSBAND--Husband and wife acquired
property as estate by the entirety after passage of Federal Revenue Act. Later
'Bell v. Morrison, I Pet. 351 (1828) ; Koop v. Cook, 67 Ore. 93, 135 Pac.
317 (1913), discussed (1914) 62 U. OF PA. L. REV. 396; Tanner v. Smart,
supra note I; I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) 371.
20Wald v. Arnold, i68 Mass. 134, 46 N. E. 419 (1897) ; Keener v. Zartman,
144 Pa. 179, 22 At. 821 (i89i) ; Maniatakis' Estate, 258 Pa. ii, ioi Atl. 920
(1917); I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) 355; CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT (Am.

L. Inst. 1928) § 86.
'In Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Oklahoma an acknowledgment tolls the Statute without the necessity of implying a promise, Elder v.
Dyer, 26 Kan. 604 (1881) ; I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) 356. That this
rule is based on local statutes, not the common law, see Cleland v. Hostetter,
13 N. M. 43, 79 Pac. Soi (9o5).
"41 F. (2d) at lO9.
21 JAC. I, c. 16, § I (1623). The nature of the Statute is discussed in
Bell v. Morrison, supra note 9; Elder v. Dyer, supra note ii; Spencer v. Hemmerde, supra note 4.

I'D. C. CODE (1925) § 1265.
'While the District of Columbia Code provides that "no acknowledgment
or promise . . . shall be deemed sufficient . . . to take any case out of the
operation of the statute of limitations . . . unless such acknowledgment or
promise shall be . . . in some writing to be signed by the party chargeable
thereby," § 1271, this is a common form of statute, copied from the Lord Tenterden Act of 1828 (9 Geo. IV, c. 14), which is not held to alter the common
law in any other respect than in requiring written instead of parol evidence.
Spencer v. Hemmerde, supra note 4, at 512.
STAT. 777 (I916), 26 U. S. C. §§ lO91-4 (1926), § 201: "That a tax,
. is hereby imposed upon the transfer of the net estate of every decedent
dying after the passage of this act, . . ". § 2oz: "That the value of the gross
estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of
his death, of all property . . ." (c) "To the extent of the interest therein
held jointly or as tenants by the entireties by decedent and any other person, . . !" 42 STAT. 277 (1921), 26 U. S. C. §§ iO91-4 (1926) is of the same
import
139
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the husband died and the estate by the entirety was included as part of his gross
estate by federal estate tax authorities. Wife contended that as she acquired no
new interest in the property as a result of husband's death, the tax was direct
Held, that as
and consequently unconstitutional without an apportionment.
death of huband was "generating source" of valuable and definite accessions of
property rights to wife, the tax was indirect and therefore not unconstitutional
even without apportionment. Uzitecd States v. Tyler, 281 U. S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct.
3
356 (193o).
Three important cases have recently appeared before the Supreme Court
concerning the constitutionality of taxing as a part of the gross estate of a
decedent, property which had been transferred before death, but over which the
decedent had retained a certain amount of control.' In all these cases the Court
decided that taxation of the property in question was constitutional. The underlying thought of these decisions is that the occurrence of the death resulted
in the completion of a shifting of the economic benefits of the property, which
is the true subject of a transfer tax,' and consequently the tax was indirect.
The difficulty with applying this reasoning to the instant case is that Federal
7
Courts are bound by the property laws of a state in which a case arises, and
' U. S. CONST. ART. I § 9 cl. 4: "No . . . direct tax shall be laid, unless
in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken."
§ 2: "Direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which shall be
included within this Union in respect to their respective numbers."
'Two other cases upon appeal from the circuit court were decided in this
opinion: U. S. v. Provident Trust Co. of Pennsylvania, 35 F. (2d) 339 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1929) (for comment on this case, see (1929) 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 536),
and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Girard Trust Co., 35 F. (2d) 343 (C.
C. A. 3d, 1929). The facts were slightly different in the three cases, but the
same problem was involved in all of them.
' Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 48 Sup. Ct. 225 (1928) (transfer
of property with power of appointment reserved to grantor) ; Chase Nat. Bank
v. U. S., 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126 (1929) (transfer of insurance policy
with power reserved by the insured to change the beneficiary) (for a discussion
as to the probable effects of this decision, see C. C. H. FEDERAL TAX BuL..
(1929) Bull. No. 5, par. 5114) ; Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339,
49 Sup. Ct. 123 (1929) (transfers in trusts, made before death with power reserved by the settlor to revoke them).
" For a discussion on the historal development o.f transfer taxes, see Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 47, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 750 (1899).
8
In Chase Nat. Bank v. U. S., supra note 4, at 338, 49 Sup. Ct. at 129, the
court said, "Termination of the power of control at the time of death inures
to the benefit of him who owns the property subject to the power and thus brings
about at death the completion of that shifting of the economic benefits of property which is the real subject of the tax . . ."; cf. Knowlton v. Moore, supra
note 5, at 57, 20 Sup. Ct. at 754. But cf. Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47, 50,
44 Sup. Ct. 291, 292 (1924) where the court said, "What this law taxes is not
the interest to which the legatees and devisees succeeded on death, but the interest which ceased by reason of the death."
7 Warburton v. White, 176 U. S. 484, 20 Sup. Ct. 404 (igoo) ; Clarke v.
Clarke, 178 U. S. i86, 2o Sup. Ct. 873 (Igoo).
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both Pennsylvania 8 and Maryland 0 adhere to the common law rule of estates
1
by the entireties The Court nevertheless applied the reasoning that death of the
husband was an occurrence which resulted in the ripening of substantial benefits
to the wife,' passing over the difficulty mentioned by stating that the power of
taxation is not to be restricted by mere legal fictions. The economic soundness
of the decision of the instant case cannot be denied, but it seems to be somewhat inconsistent in view of the fact that the same Court has taken the position that when an estate by the entirety is created, the husband and wife each
become seised of the entirety, and on the death of one the whole rentains' to
the survivor under the original grant." While there is no direct precedent
holding unconstitutional an unapportioned federal tax on an estate by the en1
tirety when one of the tenants dies, it has been held that such a tax was not
5
within the statutory intent. Under state transfer tax acts, the courts of those
1
are not in harmony
states which have not abolished estates by the entireties
as to whether such an estate should be included as part of the gross estate of

'U. S. v. Provident Trust Co., and Commissioner v. Girard Trust Co., both
supra note 3, arose in Pennsylvania.
'The principal case arose in Maryland.
1o Biel v. Martin, 236 Pa. 519, 84 Atl. 953 (1912) ; Marburg v. Cole, 49
Md. 402 (1878); Whitelock v. Whitelock, i56 Md. 115, 143 At1. 712 (1928).
'In the principal case, at 503, 504 the Court said, "Before the death of the
husband the wife had the right to possess and use the whole property, but so,
also, had her husband. . . . At his death, however, and because of it, she for
the first time, became entitled to exclusive possession, use and enjoyment; . .
I Italics ours.
"Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U. S. 464, 469, 9 Sup. Ct. 125, 126 (1888); see
U. S. v. Robertson, 183 Fed. 71 (C. C. A. 7th, igio), petition for writ of
certiorari denied by Supreme Court, 220 U. S. 616, 31 Sup. Ct. 720 (910).
" The Supreme Court has, however, held that a state tax act including
community property as part of the gross estate of decedent spouse was not unFor a
constitutional, Moffitt v. Kelly, 218 U. S. 400, 31 Sup. Ct. 79 (gzio).
discussion on the theory of Community Property, including a compilation of
states which adhere to the doctrine, see I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed.
5 WASH. L. REV. 145.
1920) § 195; Note (930)
'Root's Appeal, 5 B. T. A. 696 (1926) ; Murphy's Appeal, 5 B. T. A. 952
(1926) ; see Blount v. U. S., 59 Ct. Cl. 328, 347 (1924), where the court said,
"We think it doubtful that subdivision (c) of § 202 of REVENUE AcT 1916 contemplates estates by the entireties in their technical sense"; see Note (1929) 77
U. OF PA. L. REv. 383.
"It has been held in some states that the rule of estates by the entireties
has been abrogated by the statutes giving legal recognition to women, Donegan
v. Donegan, io3 Ala. 488, 15 So. 823 (1893); Whyman v. Johnston, 62 Colo.
461, 163 Pac. 76 (I96) ; and in England it is so held, Thornley v. Thornley
(1893) 2 Ch. 229; but the weight of authority in the United States is otherwise, Bertless v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152 (883) ; Bramberry's Estate, 156 Pa. 628,
27 At. 405 (1893) ; see i TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 194, for a
thorough discussion of this problem see SnApRo, Estates by Entireties-Biehl
v. Martin (1913) 61 U. OF PA. L. REv. 476.
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the decedent spouse.' The holding in the principal case may well be taken as
illustrative of the tendency of the Supreme Court to disregard legal technicalities and fine distinctions of title, which hinder taxation, and effect a practical
result based, not on theories, but on facts.'
TAXATION-CONSTITUTIONALITY

UNDER

EQUAL

PROTECTION

CLAUSE-

CLAssIFicAToN OF CoRPoRATIoNs-State statute imposed a tax on financial corporations, to be measured by net income. The act recited the tax to be for the
privilege of the exercise of corporate franchises. Plaintiffs, sixty-three savings
and loan associations, seek to enjoin the state tax commission from nforcing
the act against them, alleging that individuals and copartnerships in the same
business are vigorous competitors and are not so taxed, that the tax is not in
lieu of any other tax on plaintiffs, and that the act is therefore discriminatory.
Defendants demur to the complaint. Held (three judges dissenting), that the
statute constitutes a discrimination against corporations engaged in the same
business with natural persons and is, therefore, unconstitutional under Section I
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution o.f the United States. Aberdeen Savings & Loan Ass'n et al. v. Chase et al., Tax Commission, 289 Pac. 536
(Wash. 1930).
This case is of particular interest since it is apparently the first decision in
a federal or state court following the new precedent set in Quaker City Cab
Co. v. Cominwealth of Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 48 Sup. Ct. 553 (1927).
For a discussion of the problems involved, see Note (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L.

REV.

120.

TORTS-LABILITY

OF VENDOR AND VENDEE TO A TENANT FOR DEFECTIVE

CONDITION OF A COMMXON PASSAGEWAY-The defendant conveyed an apartment
house to a vendee who immediately went into possession. Three days later the
plaintiff, a.tenant, was injured by a fall caused by the giving way of a defective
rail which the jury found was part of the common passageway. Evidence
showed that defendant had knowledge of the defect prior to conveyance. The
action was for damages for injuries sustained. Held, that defendant was not
liable as a landlord and that the only basis of his liability would be as a vendor
of real estate in a defective condition. Kiliner v. White, 171 N. E. 9o8 (N. Y.
1930).

The rule is broadly stated that a vendor of real estate is relieved of liability
2
immediately after the transfer of possession' unless he has created a nuisance
"Mass, has held that an estate by the entirety should not be included as
part of a gross estate of a decedent spouse, Palmer v. Mansfield, 222 Mass. 263,
iio N. E. 283 (1915). But cf. Klatzl's Estate, 216 N. Y. 83, ii0 N. E. 181
(1915) where it was held that one-half of the estate by entirety should be
taxed, under a state act similar to the Federal Revenue Act.
See Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 50 Sup. Ct. 336 (1930).

'Upp v. Darney, i5o
Mass. 430, 97 N. E. 877
351, 153 N. E. 444 (926)
2
Rosewell v. Prior, 2

Iowa 43, 13o N. W. 409 (1911) ; Curry v. Dorr, 21o
(1912) ; Wilks v. N. Y. Telegraph Co., 243 N. Y.
; Palmore v. Morris, 182 Pa. 82, 37 Atl. 995 (1897).
Salkfeld 46o (1701).
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or failed to disclose a hidden defect of which he is aware? It is said this
liability is predicated upon possession and hence liability is terminated with
the transfer of possession.' The few cases there are' support this rule insofar
as it deals with liability to one outside the premises but apparently there are no
cases where liability to one on the premises is concerned. The Torts RestateImnet of thw Ainerica Law Institute6 however, includes those on the premises
as within the scope of this rule. This court, in dealing with the liability of
the defendant, followed the Restateimwnt and in discussing the liability of the
vendee went still further into an attempt at conformity with the Restate.ent.
Formerly, as the court states,' a vendee's liability under the New York rule did
not begin until he had a reasonable time to discover defects and to make repairs.
This old rule the court purports to change to the Restatement rule that a
vendee's liability arises as soon as he takes possession.8 The advantage of the
Restatement view is apparent in that it does away with that interim between
conveyance and a reasonable time thereafter during which plaintiff's injury
would go without redress. The application of this rule to the instant case,
if it is kept in mind that the vendee is also a landlord, raises a difficult problem
in that the vendee rule conflicts with the rule as to liability of a landlord. It is
generally held that a landlord is liable for injuries to a tenant caused by defects
in a common passageway only if he fails to repair after a reasonable length
of time after he should have discovered the defect
Thus, as a vendee the
liability is immediate whereas the liability as a landlord ensues only after a
reasonable length of time. There seems to be no escape from the dilemma
other than to hold that it is preferable to treat the liability as that of a vendee
since it does away with: first, the interim of no liability as mentioned above;
and second, the contentious problem of what is a reasonable length of time'

TRUSTS-EFFECT OF RESERVATION OF POWNER TO CHANGE BmEmFICiARYUnder an employee stock purchasing plan, company agreed to turn over funds
to trustees, who were to purchase company's shares. Employee could terminate
trust by withdrawal before the expiration of five years which was set as the
date when the arrangement was to end. Death of employee was to terminate
trust, at which time accumulated proceeds were to be paid to employee's estate
or any beneficiary designated. Employee died and administratrix claimed
against beneficiary on the ground that the designation did not comply with the
3

TORTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1929)
'SALMOND, TORTS (7th ed. 1928) 277.

§ 223.

'Supra note i.
TORTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1929) " 222.
At page 9io.
8
TORTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1929) §223, p. 190; see also Reporter's Illustration, ibid. § 245, p. 236; Note (1926) 5 TENN. L. RFv. 57'Uhl v. Hull, 130 Wash. 9o, 226 Pac. 723 (1924) ; TIFrANY, LANDLORD AND
TENANT (Igo) §§ 89a, 89c.
" TORTS RESTATEMENT DRAFT 4,. EXPLANATORY NOTE (1929) 43.
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Statute of Wills. Held, by a seven to six majority of the court, that the desgnation of beneficiary was not a testamentary disposition. In re Koss's Estate,
15o At. 360 (N. J. I93O).

Courts are by no means in complete accord as to whether a given series of
acts, have resulted in the creation of a trust, or are merely an attempted testamentary disposition.' It is quite well settled, however, that neither the retention of a life estate by the settlor nor the power to revoke or change the beneficiary' renders a trust testamentary and hence invalid, i~fthe statutory requirements for a will are not complied with. In fact there is substantial agreement
among the authorities that even the presence of both, the reservation of a life
interest and the power to revoke, will not, without more, cause the trust to be
held testamentary.' The essential difference between a trust and a will is that
the former acts at once to vest an interest in the beneficiary, while in the latter
there is no interest vested until the moment of the testator's death.6 The application of this seemingly simple rule to the facts in the instant case presents serious
difficulties if the result reached by the court be deemed desirable. If the premise
be granted that a valid trust had in the first instance been established, there is a
strong argument that the beneficiary had no interest vested in such trust, but
merely the expectation of getting an interest if the settlor died within the prescribed period.' Perhaps in order to avoid the obstacles that would be encountered if the law of trusts were strictly adhered to, the New Jersey court followed the analogy to a life insurance contract. Such policies are regarded as
third party beneficiary contracts ' and not subject to the operation of the Statute
of Wills. The analogy was completed by the contention that the designation of
the beneficiary was the nomination of the party for whose benefit the contract
was made. In reaching this conclusion the court felt themselves constrained to
hold that there was no specific res to which the employee was entitled. The
reasoning of the court, being based on the findings that the contract in question

2PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

(7th ed. I929) § 97; A. W. Scott, Trusts

and The Statute of Wills (193o) 43 HARv. L. REv. 521.

I Adams v. Hagerate, 34 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) ; National Newark
and Essex Banking Co. v. Rosahl, 97 N. J. Eq. 74, 128 At. 586 (1925).
' Nichols v. Emory, io9 Cal. 323, 41 Pac. io89 (895) ; Lines v. Lines, 142
Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 8o9 (1891) ; Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., 245 Pa. 349, 9i Atl.
634 (914) ; Cramer v. Hartford Conn. Trust Co., i47 Atl. 139 (Conn. 1929) ;

Leaphart, The Trust as a Substitute for a Will (1930) 78 U. oF PA. L. REv. 626,
at 63o. Cf. Bullen v. State of Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473 (i9i6).
'Bear v. Milliken Trust Co., 336 Ill. 366, i68 N. E. 349 (1929) ; Jones v.
Old Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309, 146 N. E. 716 (1925); Windolph v.
Girard Trust Co., supra note 3.
'Nichols v. Emory, supra note 3; PERRY, loc. cit. supra note I.
'This was the view of the Prerogative Court of New Jersey. See it re
Koss's Estate, ioS N. J. Eq. 29, 146 At. 471 (1929).
7The New Jersey view is that such policies are third party beneficiary contracts and that the beneficiary gets a vested interest which is subject to divestment, Sullivan v. Maroney, 77 N. J. Eq. 565, 78 Ati. 15o (i9io). Indiana National Life Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, i8o Ind. 9, ioI N. E. 289 (1913). But this
is not the majority view. See VANCE, LAW OF INSURANCE (2d ed. 193o) § 147.

RECENT CASES
was made expressly for the benefit of a third person and did not result in the
establishment of a valid trust,8 seems untenable in the face of the plain facts.
It must be conceded that this type of contract has the support of public policy
and that the method employed is a convenient way to dispose of the beneficial
interest. Therefore, the court might well have reached the same result by a
frank admission that the disposition in question although contrary to the letter
of the Statute of Wills was in accord with its spirit

VENDOR AND PURCAsER-RrsK OF Loss AFTER CONTRACT TO CONvEY
BUT BEFORE ACTUAL CONVEYANCE-PossEsSION AS DETERMINING FACTOR-In

suit by vendor to enforce payment on a non-negotiable note given to secure the
purchase price of land and building, it appeared that the building had been accidentally destroyed by fire. Held, that the vendor could not recover, but might
retain the money already paid as a fair rental for the occupation of the premises. Dunham et al. v. McReady, decided by Supreme Court of Maine, U. S.
Daily, October ii, i93o, at 2461.

In deciding on whom to place the burden of risk for loss, incurred after a
contract for the sale of land, but before conveyance, it is the expressed premise
in some cases' and the inarticulate premise in many others 2 that it shall be on
him who, at the moment of loss, may be considered owner. The dual nature of
the concept of ownership in our law has caused the split of opinion that attends
the problem. The majority of courts' regard the fact that the vendee acquires
It seems that the Court confused the problem of retention of control by
the settlor with the question of whether there existed a specific fund to which a
trust could be attached. Even where there is a specific fund, if the control retained by the settlor over such fund is virtually ambulatory, the trust will be
held testamentary. For a case where control by settlor was a factor, see
Stevenson v. Earl, 65 N. J. Eq. 721, 55 At. io9I (i9o3). The holding in the
instant case that no trust was created, may in later litigation militate against
the interests of employees who seek to enforce their rights.
'The purpose of the Statute of Wills being to prevent fraud, once the
courts are satisfied no fraud is present they might well relax the rigidity of the
formality required, see A. W. Scott, Conveyances Upon Trusts Not Properly
Declared (1924) 37 HARv. L. RPv. 653, at 688.
'See McGinley v. Forrest, io7 Neb. 309, 312, i86 N. V. 74, 75 0 920);
Wilson v. Clark, 6o N. H. 352, 353 (i88o).
2 Poole v. Adams, io L. T. 287 (1864) ; Linn County Bank v. Grisham, io5
Kan. 46o, 186 Pac. 54 (i919) ; Reed v. Lukens, 44 Pa. 200 (1864).
I Paine v. Mellor, 6 Ves. 349 (i8oi) ; Reife v. Osmers, 252 N. Y. 320, 169
N. E. 399 (1929) ; Maudru v. Humphreys, 83 W. Va. 3o7, 98 S. E. 259 (1919).
In most of the American decisions upholding the majority view, Lord Eldon's
language in Paine v. Meller, ibid. is quoted. The careful analysis of eminent
jurists has shown that the English leading case is not necessarily authority for
the facts to which it has repeatedly been applied, see Williston, The Risk of
Loss After an Executory Contract of Sale in the Common Law (1895) 9 HARV.
L. R v. io6, 1i; Vanneman, Risk of Loss in Equity Between the Date of Contract to Sell Real Estate and the Transfer of Title (1924) 8 MiNN. L. REV. 127,

128.
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equitable title and the right to specific performance" from the contract of sale
as conclusive of ownership.' A minority of jurisdictions,' of which the instant
case is representative, criticize this view because the vendor holds the legal title
and the incidents thereof-the rights to possession and to the profits of the
property -- and place the risk of loss on the vendor, who cannot effectuate his
promise. As neither equitable nor legal title is complete ownership it would
seem more advisable to approach the problem from the angle of the intention of
the contracting parties. Professor Williston' has stressed this factor and urges
that possession be treated as the criterion of unexpressed intention, but what
°
Yet
little support there is in the cases ' for this theory seems to be waning
the reasoning behind the suggestion appears sound for it is reasonable to infer
that the vendee in possession considers himself the owner, having every incident of ownership save the legal title, which the vendor may be said to hold for
security; and it is similarly reasonable to infer that the vendee not in possession does not consider himself the present owner, lacking that which is vital for
complete ownership, that is not only the legal title but the rights to possession
and to the profits of the property. Certainly a consideration of the actual intention of contracting parties will make for a decrease in litigation, a fact of considerable practical importance." Therefore, despite the formidable bulk of authority
'One authority, at least, has questioned the validity of this mode of reasoning, pointing out that the real question to be determined is whether equity ought
to enforce the contract under the circumstances, and has argued from analogy
that equity should not, Stone, Equitable Conversion.by Contract (1913) 13 Co.
L. REv. 369, 386.
"See Keener, The Burden of Loss as an Incident to the Right to the Specific Performance of a Contract (19ol) I Coi. L. REy. I, 3 who lists different
situations in which equity treats the vendee as owner, and urges the support of
the English view for the sake of uniformity. Vanneman, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 132 ff. argues by way of criticism that in most of the enumerated instances
the concern is that of a third party volunteer and a party to the contract and
not that of both contracting parties.
I Wilson v. Clark, mpra note i; Connel et at. v. Savings Bank of Newport,
47 R. I. 6o, 129 Atl. 803 (1925) ; Ashford v. Reese, 132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac.
29 (1925).

7Stratton v. California Land Co., 86 Cal. 353, 24 Pac. io65 (189o) ; In re
Boyle's Est., 154 Iowa 249, 134 N. W. 590 (1912).
I Williston, op. cit. supra note 2; Vanneman, op. cit. supra note 2 seems to
qualify Williston's suggestion but in essentials the two theories are identical.
o Conlin v. Osborn, 161 Cal. 659, 120 Pac. 755 (191I) ; Good v. Jarrard, 93
S. C. 229, 76 S. E. 698 (1912) ; see dissenting opinion of McGinley v. Forrest,
107 Neb. 309, 314, 186 N. W. 74, 76 (1921) defended in (1922) 70 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 248.
10 In New York there have been decisions both ways, but the recent unani-

mous holding in Reife v. Osmers, supra note 2, is virtually conclusive that the
vendee must stand the risk, and is likely to influence other jurisdictions. At one
time California seemed on the point of adopting the theory based on possession
but in LaChance v. Brown, 41 Cal. App. 500, 183 Pac. 216 (1919) the vendee
was in possession and the loss was placed on the vendor.
"By leaving the loss where it lay, that is on the one in possession troublesome litigation would be minimized. Further, the confused insurance situation
would be cleared n). Vanneman, op. cit. supra note 2, at 142 ff. treats this aspect
of the question in detail.
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to the contrary and the repeated repudiation of this doctrine, the preferable view
is that which is grounded on the determination of what the contracting parties
intended in the particular case, rather than that which is based on the rigid
application of established law.

WILLS-EVIDENcE-ExTRINSIc CIRCUMSTANCES AS SHOWING INTENTION OF

TESTATRIx-Testatrix, by 1911 will, disposed only of property in New York and
stipulated that her property elsewhere Would be disposed of by a later will.
In I92, testatrix made another will disposing of all property not mentioned
in the 19II will. In 1924 a new will was made "revoking all former wills by me
made." Held, that in the light of extrinsic circumstances it was highly probable that intention of testatrix (in 1924 will) was to revoke merely "all former
wills" in which property other than that in Nezw York was made the subject
of disposition. Hence the 1924 will did not revoke the 1911 will. It re Smith's
Will, 254 N. Y. 283, 172 N. E. 499 (193o).
From the language of the will a reasonable interpretation of "revoking all
former wills by me made" would appear to be that all former wills are thereby
revoked. The limitation added by the court (i. e., excluding wills devising New
York property from the operation of the revoking clause) is made possible only
by reading it into the will after first considering the extrinsic circumstances.
This is quite in accord with the modem cases recognizing that it is the intention
of the testatrix the court is seeking to enforce, and that this is best ascertained
by "putting oneself in the testatrix's armchair" and considering the circumstances
surrounding the making of the will,' but it is, of course, in direct conflict with
the older view,-2 that extrinsic circumstances may be considered only where a
definite meaning cannot be obtained from the will as it stands3 Though this
older approach is somewhat obsolete, perplexing vestiges of it still remain both
in the form of dicta and of holdings. Thus, numerous recent cases (some of
them in New York) intimate that extrinsic circumstances are to be considered
only in cases of ambiguity on the face of the will" and others hold that where
the wording of the will admits of a reasonable interpretation as it stands, that
meaning will be taken, even though the inference from extrinsic circumstances
'Briant v. MeGown, 15 S. W. (2d) 1iO (Tex., 1929); In re Hoornbeck's
Ex'r, 135 Misc. Rep. 247, 228 N. Y. Supp. 765 (1929); Safe Deposit and
Trust Company v. Hutton, 149 Atl. 689 (Md., 1930); 5 WIGMCoI, EVIDENCE
(1923) § 2470; 2 PAGE, WILLS (1926) § 1415; Holmes, Theory of Legal Interpretation (1899) 12 HARv. L. REv. 417.

'Lord Cheyney's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 68a (Eng., 1591) ; Coker v. Guy, 2 Bos. &
P. 565 (Eng., i8oi) ; Mann v. Mann, 14 Johns (N. Y.) I (186) ; Hand v.
Hoffman, 8 N. J. L. 86 (1825) ; Theall v. Theall, 7 La. 226 (1834).
a5 WIG-MORE, op cit. supra § 2472; 4 JONES, COMENTARIES ON EviDENCE
(1926) § 1596.
"it re Ryan's Estate, 191 Cal. 307, 216 P. 366 (1923) ; Stubbs v. Abel, I4
Ore. 61o, 233 P. 852 (1925) ; In re Gargiulo's Will, 134 Misc. Rep. 182, 236 N. Y.
Supp. 143 (1929); In re Kavenaugh's Will, 133 Misc. Rep. 399, 232 N. Y.
Supp. 308 (1929) ; 4 JONES, op. cit. supr note 3 §§ 1596, 1598.
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indicates a probability that testatrix's intent was otherwise.5 By thus resting
their decision in this difficult case upon an acceptance in toto of Prof. Wigmore's
clear analysis of the modern rule' (i. e. that the court may ascertain the testatrix's intention from both the language of the will and the extrinsic circumstances--the use of such extrinsic circumstances being subject to two limitations:
(I) direct statements of intention contrary to the expressed intention are inadmissible, and (2) the language of the will must be susceptible of such interpretation), the court has apparently removed the confusion caused by the surviving
vestiges of the older rule-a course worthy of emulation elsewhere.
I Farrar v. Pemberton, 152 S. E. 339 (Va., i93o) ; Schowalter v. Schowalter, 128 So. 458 (Ala., i93o) ; McCormick v. Hall, 337 Ill. 232, i68 N. E. goo
(1930).
65

WIGMOR,

EVIDENCE (1923)

§§

2470, 2471, 2472.

